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[VOL. 42

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5222: Action for damages arising from negligent violation
of restraining notice allowed.
CPLR 5222 states what must be contained in a restraining
notice, the form such notice may take, on whom it may be served,
how it may be served, its effect and duration. In addition, CPLR
5222(a) states that a restraining notice must "state that disobedience is punishable as a contempt of court." 143 The restraining
notice is an independent remedy under the CPLR.14 1 Its purpose
is to make a creditor's specification of a debt, in which he claims
the debtor has an interest, effective to prevent a payment or trans45
fer until an order is issued or determination made by a court.2
The effect of a restraining notice is not merely to give notice, but
46
also to give injunctive relief.1

Not only the debtor, but any

person, e.g., a garnishee, may be punished for contempt after disobeying a restraining notice.' 47
Although it had been suggested that a contempt proceeding
was not the only remedy for violation of a restraining notice
under the CPLR, 4 s no court had previously addressed itself to the
specific issue. A similar question was raised, however, in regard
to civil contempt proceedings under Section 773 of the Judiciary
Law. In Reidel Glass Works, Inc. v. Francis Kurtz and Co., 49
it was stated that section 773 was an express recognition that
contempt proceedings under section 753 were only a concurrent
remedy and did not bar an action for damages. Furthermore, in
S. Lipkin and Son, Inc. v. Bautann,50° it was recognized that
while an adjudication of contempt may not be warranted by the
facts, a party may be liable on the same facts in a separate proceeding for violation of an injunction.
In the recent decision of Mazzuka v. Bank of North
America, -'l the New York City Civil Court, Queens County, allowed
'4' CPLR 5251 provides that disobedience of a restraining order is punishable as contempt of court.
'447B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5222, commentary 79 (1963).
145 Sumitomo Shoji v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 47 Misc. 2d 741,
263 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1965), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d
499, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1966).
'1 Id.
.47 7B MCKiNNEyS CPLR 5251, commentary 207 (1963).
4s Sumitomo Shoji v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 47 Misc. 2d 741,
-745, 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
'49260 App. Div. 163, 20 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't 1940), reargument
denied, 260 App. Div. 859, 23 N.Y.S.2d 479, aff'd and appeal dismissed,
287 N.Y. 636, 39 N.E.2d 270 (1941).
-150 100 N.Y.S.2d 270 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1950).
15153 Misc. 2d 1053, 280 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).

1968]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

an action for damages for the negligent violation of a restraining
notice. The court analogized Section 773 of the Judiciary Law
to CPLR 5222 and 5251, concluding that a contempt proceeding
under the CPLR for violation of a restraining notice was a concurrent remedy which did not bar an action for damages. While
CPLR 5251 called for "refusal or willful neglect" 152 for a contempt proceeding to be successful, the facts in Mazzuka, as noted,
showed the disobedience of the restraining
notice to be caused by
53
a mistake and in no way willful.
ARTICLE 55

-

APPEALS GENERALLY

CPLR 5511: Defendant may obtain limited review of a final
determination when based only in part on his default.
CPLR 5511 provides that " [a]n aggrieved party . . . may
appeal from any appealable judgment or order except one entered
upon the default of the aggrieved party." This provision carries forward the provision found in CPA 557 and is based on the
rationale that where a party defaults, he has acquiesced in the
judgment against him, abandoning his legal position, and therefore
there can be no error of the lower court which may be the subject
of an appeal. However, in those cases where the defendant did
contest all or some of the issues against him, he is afforded a
limited right to appeal. Thus, if a defendant defaults only in
part, he may seek review of those issues which were the subject
of a contest in the lower court.'
James v. Powell,5 5 is an illustration of this proposition.
There, the appellants contested the trial court's judgment awarding
M

152 Prior to 1965, CPLR 5251 required only "failure" to obey in order
to punish for contempt. In 1965 "refusal and willful neglect" were

substituted for "failure." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 773, § 14.
'3 Even without the change in statutory language of CPLR 5251,
it
would be impossible to definitively state that contempt requires or does not
require the element of intent Compare People v. McCloskey, 6 N.Y.2d 390,
160 N.E.2d 647, 188 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1959), and Ditomaso v. Loverno, 242
App. Div. 190, 273 N.Y.S.2d 76 (2d Dep't 1934) (two civil contempt cases
where willfulness was assumed to be an element of civil contempt), with
People ex rel. Negas v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y. 402 (1882), and Faulisi v. Board
of Police Commi'rs, 7 Misc. 2d 704, 162 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Steuben
County 1957) (two criminal contempt cases wherein it was stated that willfulness is not necessary for a civil contempt proceeding).
54 See 7 WziNsrrn,
KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIvL PRACticE
1115511.10, 5511.11 (1964). See also People v. Connelly, 217 N.Y. 570, 573,
112 N.E. 579, 580 (1916); Sirianni v. Sirianni, 14 App. Div. 2d 432, 22
N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1961); Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
165 App. Div. 506, 150 N.Y.S. 1039 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd, 220 N.Y.
363, 115 N.E. 1001 (1917).
1- 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967). One of the
appeals was from the affirmance of the order striking defendant's answers

